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Abstract 
The existing tax fairness literature suggests that there are four dimensions of tax fairness: horizontal equity, vertical 
equity, exchange equity, and procedural fairness. Although research suggests that compliance usually increases 
with tax fairness, this study sought to uncover the individual impact of each dimension of tax fairness on the 
compliance behaviour of medium and large corporate taxpayers in Kenya. Employing a structural equation 
modelling technique, we find that reliable measures of tax fairness are established under the procedural fairness 
dimension. We also find that the different dimensions of tax compliance are influenced differently by the control 
variables. As such, policies to enhance compliance in Kenya would require a multi-faceted approach that critically 
takes on board what has traditionally been considered as tax fairness measures-since some measures in fact worsen 
compliance levels, contrary to expectations. 
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1. Introduction 
Tax compliance is an important government policy for Kenya as it is the single largest source of government 
revenue. Corporate tax payers are an important source of revenue contributing about 75% of domestic revenues 
collected in Kenya (KRA, 2016). Due to the significance of tax revenues, tax administrators in most countries 
usually put an enormous effort into understanding and dealing with noncompliance (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001). 
Most of the previous tax compliance studies have focused on developed countries, mainly in the US, UK and 
Australia. There is still very little literature on tax compliance behaviour of African countries, and more so, 
focusing on the corporate taxpayers-notwithstanding the role played by this segment in overall tax revenue 
mobilization. To reduce noncompliance, deterrence has been the most widely utilized policy instrument of choice 
used by most tax authorities (Schneider, 2011). However a number of studies have acknowledged that enforcement 
is costly, and that most tax authorities have limited resources to address the scale of noncompliance in their 
respective tax jurisdictions (McKerchar, 2001 & Frey, 2003). Consequently, there is an increasing need for tax 
researchers to focus on the behavioural determinants of tax compliance, rather than rely on traditional models, in 
order to better understand and address noncompliance in the current tax environment. This study focuses on both 
traditional and the behavioural / demographic determinants (e.g. age, tax liability, size as measured by total 
turnover) of tax compliance as well as incorporating the measures of tax fairness exchange, procedural, horizontal 
and vertical in order to offer alternative ways of reducing noncompliance. The contribution of the study is in 
particularly examining the role of tax fairness on compliance behaviour among the key taxpayers in Kenya i.e. the 
medium and large corporate taxpayers. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
Procedural justice theory and distributive justice theory are used to explain the reasoning behind tax payers’ 
perception on fairness of the tax system and the effect on tax compliance.  
 
2.1 Procedural Justice Theory (PJT) and Distributive Justice Theory (DJT) 
Thibaut and Walker (1975) and Leventhal (1980) were the early pioneers of the development of Procedural Justice 
Theory (PJT) in tax research. Thibaut and Walker (1975) developed PJT from their pioneering work on disputes 
resolution procedures. The findings from their study demonstrate that an individual’s evaluation of the fairness of 
the tax authority decision-making processes and procedures will influence their acceptance of the outcome from 
any dispute resolution. This hypothesis has been strongly supported by a number of subsequent studies on the 
resolution of legal disputes (Tyler 1988). The findings suggest that a disputant who is given control of the disputes 
resolution process, or process control, will be more likely to consider the verdict to be fair, even when the outcome 
is not favourable. Process control refers to control over the opportunity to be able to present evidence to support 
an individual’s arguments in respect of the dispute. The finding by Thibaut and Walker (1975) is important for 
this research as it will assist in evaluating the fairness of the dispute mechanisms put in place by KRA. 
Distributive Justice Theory(DJT) postulates that individuals judge equity not only not only in terms of 
assessing the benefits they receive from their tax dollars (exchange fairness), but also by comparing themselves 
with others (Lamm and Schwinger, 1980). In other words, individuals compare their benefits-received-to-
contributions-ratio with that of others in their reference group, and if individuals find a disparity, they find their 
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dealings inequitable (Walster et al., 1978). DJT predicts that distribution outcomes should be equal among those 
with similar contributions. Although these studies apply to individuals, it has been shown that their findings can 
be applicable to corporate tax payers (Rice,1992; Slemrod, 1997).  
 
2.2 Empirical studies on Fairness 
Gerbing (1988) observes that tax fairness is a multidimensional construct, and existing tax fairness literature 
suggests that there are four tax fairness dimensions: horizontal equity, vertical equity, exchange equity, and 
procedural fairness. These four dimensions will be used to assess fairness in this study.  Erich et al., (2006) 
observed that fairness perceptions can take various forms. First, vertical fairness, asserts that taxpayers with 
different economic situations should be taxed at different rates; higher income earners should pay tax at higher 
rates than low-income earners. Second, horizontal fairness is achieved when taxpayers of the same economic 
positions should pay the same amount of tax. These two dimensions of fairness are derived from Distributive 
Justice Theory. From the definition one can assert that vertical fairness is a very subjective concept because the 
rich would deem it unfair to pay tax at higher rates just because they have higher income; they may even feel that 
they are being penalized for having a higher income. On the other hand it may be argued that in a developing 
country like Kenya which is still building its infrastructure, it may be necessary to tax the rich more, since the poor 
may not have sufficient taxable income. 
In addition to vertical and horizontal fairness, Reithel et al., (2007) identified procedural fairness which refers 
to whether or not the processes accompanying resource allocations are applied in an equitable manner, and in a 
tax context refers to whether the processes used by a tax authority are applied in an equitable manner. Another 
significant fairness dimension is exchange fairness discussed by Gilligan and Richardson (2005) and Gerbing 
(1988); this dimension of fairness holds that taxpayers will have fair perceptions of the tax system if the benefits 
received from the government are equitable compared to their tax contributions. Exchange fairness is a difficult 
dimension to measure as the definition of taxation asserts that tax is compulsory and one should not expect an 
equivalent amount of benefit from the government. The question then is how much should we expect from 
government given the tax we have paid. In Kenya the government has multiple obligations, for example the 
provision of free health care, free primary education, security etc. with limited resources from taxation. So it is 
likely that “exchange fairness’’ as understood in Kenya is very different to that in a developed economy. I expect 
the business tax payers to be bothered with whether the government has provided sufficient infrastructure and 
security given its limited resources.  
Slemrod (2007) notes that tax fairness literature tends to show a positive association between fairness and tax 
compliance.  However studies from different countries indicate different results for individual fairness dimensions. 
Thus, a complete understanding regarding which dimensions of fairness are likely to impact compliance in various 
national contexts remains to be achieved. Saad (2009), Kirchler et al., (2006), Trivedi et al., (2003), and Wenzel 
(2002b) found a positive association between horizontal equity and tax compliance. Saad (2009) was set in 
Malaysia, Kirchler et al. (2006) and Wenzel (2002) in Australia, and Trivedi et al. (2003) in Canada. Vogel (1974), 
Maroney et al., (1998), Maroney et al. (2002), and Kirchler (2006) found a positive association between vertical 
equity and tax compliance. Saad (2009) found no positive association. Although Saad’s (2009) results were 
different, her study was Malaysian while the other studies were set in Sweden, the United States and Australia, 
which suggests that there may be cross-national differences that impact the association between vertical equity 
and compliance.  
Exchange equity is positively associated with tax compliance in Vogel (1974), Spicer and Lundstedt (1976),) 
Warneryd and Walerud (1982), Wallschutzky (1984), Porcano (1988), Alm et al., (1992), Maroney et al. (2002), 
Kim (2002), King and Sheffrin (2002), Wenzel (2002b), and Richardson (2006b). There was no significant positive 
association between exchange equity and tax compliance in Keenan and Dean (1980) and Saad (2009). Again the 
results could be affected by national differences. The existing literature, which has been examined in various 
countries other than Kenya, demonstrates that procedural fairness is positively associated with tax compliance in 
Porcano (1988),) Wenzel (2002b), Murphy (2003), and Murphy (2004). Thus from the above literature one can 
hypothesize that tax fairness (as measured by the four constructs are positively correlated with tax compliance. 
Sapiei, Kasipillai and Eze (2014) studied large corporate tax payers in Malaysia and found a significant relationship 
between perceived fairness in the tax rate structure and the under-reporting of income, as well as between the 
perception of fairness of the tax system and the over-claiming of expenses. Perceptions on fairness of the corporate 
tax system was measured in relation to three dimensions, which comprise respondents’ perception on company 
officers’ moral obligations, fairness under the self- assessment environment, and amount of taxes paid over the 
years. 
 
2.3 Tax compliance models 
Theoretical models that explain tax compliance behaviour can be divided into two groups, non-economic and 
economic models. The non-economic tax compliance models on the one hand identify several non-economic 
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factors as important determinants of tax compliance, which include measures of tax fairness, complexity, 
subjective norms and attitudes of taxpayers (Orviska and Hudson, 2002). On the other hand, the economic models 
identify several factors that affect tax compliance behaviour, including opportunity to evade, deterrence, and 
detection rates (see for instance: Slemrod, 2007). The implication of these models is that when there are low audit 
probabilities and low penalties, the tendency for evasion will be higher, while if there is a high tendency for 
detection and penalties are severe, fewer people will evade taxes (Fjeldstad, Schulz-Herzenberg & Sjursen, 2012). 
However, the economic models have been criticized for predicting general substantial noncompliance beyond what 
is obtainable in reality (Slemrod, 2007). This study adopts a model which combines the economic and 
noneconomic variables in one model. The study has several independent variables including attitudes, subjective 
norms, Perceived Behavioural Controls (TPB), fairness and complexity (PJT and DJT), and compliance costs. 
Most previous studies on compliance have focused more on the individual rather than the corporate taxpayer. 
Nonetheless, several tax compliance studies (Rice, 1992; Joulfaian, 2000) have acknowledged that prior tax 
compliance studies on individuals provide a formal framework for the analysis of corporate tax compliance 
decisions. The few studies which have been conducted on corporate tax payers have concluded that non-human 
factors applicable to corporate taxpayers need to be considered. Factors such as business profile, industry and 
economic elements (OECD, 2004) may have an influence on corporate compliance. Rice (1992) showed that firm 
size and tax compliance are not positively related but that the higher the amount of a firm’s turnover, the greater 
the reporting gap. Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod (2007) notes that firm size is positively correlated with non-
compliance. However, combined with other information, corporate tax non-compliance is U shaped, suggesting 
that medium-sized companies have the lowest rate of non-compliance. Blackwell (2000) argues that larger and 
older firms with less complicated tax situations are more compliant than firms that are smaller, younger and have 
more complicated tax situations.  
This study examines four demographic factors which include: size (turnover), tax liability, ownership 
structure and length of time the company has been in business. In this study i hypothesize that there is a relationship 
between corporate characteristics (firm size, age, sector and legal structure) and the compliance of corporate 
taxpayers; that there is there is a positive relationship between business size and the compliance of corporate 
taxpayers; that there is relationship between business sectors and the compliance of corporate taxpayers; that there 
is positive relationship between business age and compliance of corporate taxpayers, and that there is a negative 
relationship between business tax liability and the compliance of corporate taxpayers. 
 
3. Methodology 
The population for this study included two categories of tax payers; large sized tax payers and medium sized tax 
payers as classified by the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), the tax collection agency in Kenya. Large sized 
companies are defined by KRA as tax payers with an annual turnover of USD7.5million and above. As of 1st May 
2017, 1,315 companies were registered as large tax payers.  Medium sized companies (MTOs) as defined by KRA 
as those companies with an annual turnover of between USD. 3million and USD.7.5million per annum. In this 
study a stratified sample of 100 companies is used. The choice of 100 firms is motivated by the choice of the 
modelling and analysis strategy that the study intends to use, i.e. the structural equations modelling that performs 
best with at least 100 cross sections (Farrington, 2009).  In this regard, and based on the proportions of the firms 
in the total population, the study obtained responses from 50 large-sized firms and 50 medium-sized firms.  A semi 
structured questionnaire is then used to collect data. The validity and reliability of the questionnaire was established 
using the Cronbach coefficient (alpha).   According to Hair et al. (2006), alpha examines how homogenous and 
reflective a tool is in relation to the underlying constructs. A Cronbach coefficient alpha (CA) of 0.70 or above is 
considered a reliable while one of 0.80 is considered even better. Likewise, when the Cronbach coefficient alpha 
is between 0.60 and 0.70, it is only acceptable only if other indicators are good. The results for this study are 
discussed in Table 4.6  
After data had been collected, the quantitative data was analysed using Structural Equation Model (SEM) 
program which has been cited in literature as appropriate for testing relationships among multiple independent and 
dependent constructs (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000). The Structural Equation Model (SEM) is a multivariate 
approach that allows researchers to concurrently examine both measurement and structural components of a model 
by testing the relationships among multiple independent and dependent constructs. According to Haenlein and 
Kaplan (2004), SEM identifies the measurement model and underlying variables by “converting theoretical and 
derived concepts into unobservable (latent) variables, and empirical concepts into indicators, which are linked by 
a set of hypothesis.” This technique encompasses confirmatory factor analysis, path analysis and multiple 
regression components thus making it the dominant multivariate technique in modern research (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2008).  The variables in SEM are measured (observed / manifest) variables or indicators and factors 
(latent variables/ constructs). The basic idea is that a latent variable or factor is an underlying cause of multiple 
observed behaviours. Factors are weighted linear combinations that are created by the researcher and represent 
underlying constructs that have been discovered. 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/EJBM 
Vol.11, No.6, 2019 
 
36 
The factorial validity of each factor is assessed by constructing a measurement model. To this end, it is 
necessary to determine which indicators (i.e. survey questions) should be used to measure each factor (dimension). 
The minimum number of indicators needed for a factor is three (Ding et al. 1995), with four to six being ideal 
(Yang et al. 2010). Prior reliability analysis on the procedural fairness constructs was completed found 9 indicators, 
out of 11 measured, which are sufficient for analyses. For compliance, I have three indicators (excluding tax 
overpayment indicator). There are 12 factors which need to be measured: 9 procedural tax fairness and three for 
compliance. I therefore conducted a procedural fairness to analyse the propriety of the tax fairness measures, then 
do further SEM analysis to include compliance. 
 
4. Discussion of results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.1 Firm Activity (sector) 
The sample is made up of firms spread out in 16 diverse sectors of the economy. This gives an indication of the 
extent to which analysis can be used to make generalizations about the economy. Out of the 100 firms, 21 firms 
are from the finance and insurance services sector, while rental and real estate and professional services account 
for 20%. The rest of the sectors are provided below (Table. 4.1) 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of firm activity (sector) 
Sector Freq. Percent
Electricity, gas, water supply, waste services 10 10%
Construction 3 3%
Wholesale trade 1 1%
Transport , postal and warehousing 8 8%
Information, media and telecommunications 7 7%
Finance, insurance services 21 21%
Rental, hiring and real estate services 8 8%
Professional, scientific and technical services 11 11%
Administrative and support services 3 3%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 6 6%
Mining 6 6%
Manufacturing 4 4%
Retail trade (includes shops) 3 3%
Accommodation and food services 7 7%
Education and training 1 1%
Health care and social assistance 1 1%
Art and recreation services 0 0%
Public administration and safety 0 0%
100 100  
4.1.2 Legal structure of firms 
The legal structure of a firm can have a bearing on how the firm behaves in terms of compliance with statutory 
requirements, including those on tax. Out of the 100 firms sampled, 73 firms were private companies, while 11 
were publicly listed companies and the rest of the firms are presented in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 : Descriptive statistics of Legal Structure of firms 
Legal Structure Number Percent
Sole proprietorship 0 0%
Private  company 73 73%
Public company 11 11%
Un-incorporated association 1 1%
Partnership 1 1%
Trust 2 2%
Incorporated association 4 4%
Parastatal 5 5%
State Corporation 1 1%
Savings and Credit Cooperative  Organisations 1 1%
Charter 1 1%
Total 100 100  
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4.1.3 Firm Age  
The length of time that a firm has been in existence is assumed to have an impact on how it reacts and behaves 
towards statutory /legal requirements, including the tax laws. While experience can help a firm regularize its 
activities and comply with tax laws, it can also at the time imply that a firm can invest in professional services for 
tax advice and thus minimize tax liabilities. As such, it is important to control for firm age in the analysis of tax 
compliance behaviour among business tax payers. From the sample, all the firms sampled have been in existence 
for between 1 and 60 years. All the ages of the sampled firms are well distributed in terms of length of time.  
4.1.4 Firm Size (based on Firm Turnover)  
Firm size matters in decision making and compliance with statutory requirements. It is generally assumed that the 
bigger the firm (in terms of turnover), the higher its tax liability; and tax compliance behaviour will therefore vary 
with size. The sample contains 36 firms with turnover between USD3-5.5 million, 5 firms with turnover of between 
USD5.51-7.5 million, 9 firms with turnover of between USD 7.51-10million, and 50 firms with turnover of over 
USD10million. As such, there are 50 large firms and 50 medium size firms in the sample (Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Firm Turnover statistics 
Turnover (USD millions) Code Freq. Cum.
Between USD.3 -5.50m 1 36 36
Between USD.5.51 -7.50m 2 5 41
Between USD.7.51-10m 3 9 50
Over USD.10m 4 50 100
Total 100
 
4.1.5 Firm Income Tax Liability 
Income tax payment is a cost to firms and thus efforts to minimize costs would be directed to reducing the tax 
liability. It is therefore important to control for the amount of the tax liability in a study of compliance behaviour. 
This variable is closely linked to the firm turnover measure and as such is a variable that helps to confirm the 
reliability of the information collected. It is evident from the sample that the tax liability of 52 percent of the firms 
sampled was below USD0.55 million (15 of which reported nil or no tax liability during the year) while the rest 
had their tax liabilities of more than USD0.55 million. It is worth noting while turnovers of 50 firms was over 
USD 10 million, only 27 of them reported tax liability of more than USD 1million (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4 Firm Tax Liability 
Income Tax Liability (Ksh millions) code Freq. Cum.
Nil (no tax liability) 1 15 15
Less than USD. 0.3 million 2 25 40
Between USD.0.301.1m -0.55 m 3 12 52
Between USD. 0.55.1-0. 75m 4 15 67
Between USD. 0.751-1m 5 6 73
 Over USD.1m 6 27 100
Total 100  
 
4.2 Measures of Compliance 
As stated previously, there are four measures of tax compliance used in this study. First is the measure that captures 
the submission of tax return requirements, which reflects a firm’s observance with tax laws in terms of accurate 
computation of tax liability, of filling all the required tax returns at the proper time – with returns accurately 
reporting the tax liability in accordance with the rules, regulations and tax authority’s decisions applicable at the 
time at which the returns are filed. The second is the measure of compliance that is captured directly by actual tax 
payment of the correct amount of tax. Third is a measure of compliance based on the likelihood that an organization 
would understate its income in the event of financial pressure. Fourth, is a measure of the frequency of over-
payment of the tax liability- a measure of over compliance with tax requirements from the perspective of tax 
payment.  
 
4.3 Measures of Tax System Fairness  
Tax system fairness as earlier outlined is measured in three different forms applicable for income tax payers: 
procedural, horizontal, and exchange fairness. The descriptive statistics to responses on each of the three measures 
is provided below in Table 4.5. The table shows distribution of frequencies (number of responses) that capture 
measures of perceptions of firms on tax system fairness. The measurement of tax system exchange fairness is 
captured by three measures (Fairness 1 to Fairness 3) generated from responses to the questionnaire. 5
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which 34% strongly disagree) of the respondents disagree with the assertion that their firms get a fair share of 
benefits received from the government based on the amount of money paid as income taxes. However, over half 
of the firms sampled agree that the tax system is fair ( in terms of exchange) when measured from the point of 
view of the income taxes paid to government are unreasonably high and that tax revenues in Kenya are not well 
utilized by the government. 
Table 4.5: Frequency distribution of measures of fairness (Exchange, procedural, horizontal & vertical) 
  
  Strongly disagree  Strongly agree  
Total Code  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Exchange Fairness  
Fairness_1 34 10 11 20 9 6 10 100 
Fairness_2      12 9 5 15 14 10 35 100 
Fairness_3 16 3 4 11 9 14 43 100 
Procedural Fairness  
Fairness_4 11 11 9 32 17 15 5 100 
Fairness_5 19 17 12 20 15 11 6 100 
Fairness_6 12 7 6 29 23 15 8 100 
Fairness_7 12 12 7 25 26 10 8 100 
Fairness_8 11 5 13 22 27 11 11 100 
Fairness_9 9 7 11 32 20 17 4 100 
Fairness_10 18 13 11 25 24 5 4 100 
Fairness_11 27 13 11 22 14 5 8 100 
Fairness_12 6 4 8 12 17 19 34 100 
Fairness_13 7 2 5 13 7 33 33 100 
Fairness_14 24 16 14 25 9 7 5 100 
Horizontal Fairness  
Fairness_15 6 3 2 27 19 9 34 100 
Fairness_16 13 9 8 14 12 13 31 100 
Fairness_17 28 6 3 15 9 11 28 100 
Vertical fairness is excluded since in Kenya all corporate taxpayers are subjected to the same fixed tax rate 
irrespective of their income levels.  
The measurement of tax system fairness from the perspective of procedural fairness is represented by 11 
measures (Fairness 4-14). From the results in Table 4.5, a majority of respondents strongly agree with the notion 
that there is no procedural fairness of the tax system in Kenya, especially in terms of powers given to the tax office, 
and the tax office’s interest is to make the tax office’s job easier than bother about the taxpayers’ interest. The 
firms also argue strongly that the tax office does not consult widely about how to improve conditions for taxpayers, 
but instead focuses on its own interest. However, the extent to which the system is procedurally fair in terms of 
tax office’s decisions when in dispute, rules and approaches to treat taxpayers equally, basis of decision making, 
objective evaluation of taxpayers’ information, decisions by income tax local committees- fairness vary from one 
sample firm to another and opinions/ perceptions are well distributed in the Likert scale. 
In terms of horizontal fairness- i.e. the extent to which a firm pays a similar amount of income tax with other 
companies (whether in the same industry of not) earning an equivalent amount of income. These measures are 
captured by Fairness 15-17. Evidence shows that 61 % of firms agree that it is fair for their firms to pay a similar 
amount of income tax compared with other firms earning a similar amount of income. However, 27% of the firms 
are more neutral on this but leaning towards disagreement with this statement. However, 31% of firms strongly 
agree with the assertion that two firms with same income should pay the same amount of income tax irrespective 
of the industry in which they operate. The rest of the firms have diverse opinions on this latter assertion. In addition, 
I tested the firms’ perceptions on how fair their share of income tax is in terms of the tax rate applied and the tax 
proportion to profit margin. Responses were generated from Fairness 17 question. From the responses generated, 
it is clear there seems to be no clear stance by any majority group on the extent to which the tax share paid was 
fair to the taxpayers. The proportion of those that strongly agree is the same those that strongly disagree with the 
statement that the amounts of income taxes paid were fair. 
 
4.4 Data reliability test 
Prior to estimation of a structural equation model for tax fairness and compliance, it was important to first 
determine the reliability of the measures of tax fairness in the three dimensions and for compliance. In this regard, 
I calculated the Cronbach alphas for each fairness dimension and for compliance. For behavioral research, a 
minimum acceptable Cronbach alpha is 0.6 (Kerlinger & Lee 2000). I maximized the Cronbach alphas by deleting 
several indicators where appropriate. The results are tabulated in Table 4.6. All measures, except those of 
procedural fairness have Cronbach alphas less than 0.65; the recommended minimum for reliable measures. 
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Table 4.6: Cronbach Alphas for Final Measures of Reliability of Constructs (Cronbach alphas) 
Construct Indicators 
Cronbach 
alpha
Verdict
Exchange Fairness Fairness 2 & 3 0.615
Constructs are average measures
of tax fairness 
Procedural 
Fairness
Fairness 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,&14 0.7973
Constructs are reliable measures
of fairness
Horizontal fairness Fairness 15,16 &17 0.3231
Constructs are not reliable
measures of fairness
Compliance
Compliance (filing returns, tax
payment, & likelihood of 
0.5923
Mediocre measures of
compliance  
Based on the analyses of Cronbach alphas, we proceed to measure the sampling adequacy of the analysis 
using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure for the exchange and procedural fairness constructs. KMO takes values 
between 0 and 1, with small values meaning that overall the variables have too little in common to warrant a factor 
analysis.  
Table 4.7: Measures of sampling adequacy of analysis 
 Kaiser-Meyer_Olkin 
(KMO) 
Bartlett’s test of 
Spherity 
Verdict  
Exchange 
Fairness  
0.5000 χ2 (1) = 21.48  
p-value = 0.0001 
Not ok to proceed with factor analysis 
(KMO value too low) 
Procedural 
Fairness 
0.7168 χ2 (36) = 309.528  
p-value = 0.0001 
Proceed with factor analysis 
Compliance  0.5832 χ2 (3) = 32.43  
p-value = 0.0001 
Proceed with factor analysis 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure for procedural fairness verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, 
with a KMO measure of 0.7168, which is ‘good’ according to Field (2009). In addition, a Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was conducted which compares the correlation matrix with a matrix of zero correlations (technically 
called the identity matrix, which consists of all zeros except the 1’s along the diagonal). From this test a small p-
value indicates that it is highly unlikely for one to have obtained the observed correlation matrix from a population 
with zero correlation. In this study χ2 (36) = 309.528, p-value = 0.0001, which indicates that correlations between 
items were sufficiently large for principal components analysis. The KMO measure for exchange fairness point to 
sampling inadequacy for analysis of exchange fairness. I therefore proceed to conduct a valid factor analyses for 
procedural fairness and compliance.  
Once it was determined that the measurement models for procedural tax fairness and compliance display good 
fits, I proceeded to test the validity of a possible causal structure by building and analyzing a structural model. The 
structural model specifies the relationships among the latent constructs of procedural fairness and compliance. The 
SEM analysis does not prove causation, but tests the strength of the association between procedural tax fairness 
measures and tax compliance.  In this study the structural model has one dependent factor, i.e. tax compliance, and 
six independent factors; the indicators of procedural fairness. Table 4. 8 shows the regression coefficients along 
with statistical significance of the regression paths for each procedural tax fairness measures in influencing tax 
compliance. The results are generated by structural equation modelling regression.  
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Table 4. 8: SEM Regression Results of Tax Compliance on Procedural Fairness Measures 
  
Compliance 
(Filling all 
Returns) 
Compliance     
(Paying  Tax 
Payment) 
Compliance (Likelihood 
of understating income) 
Independent variables Coef. Coef. Coef. 
(Measures of procedural fairness): (std errors) (std errors) (std errors) 
fairness 4 
0.0102              
(0.0151) 
0.0403**   -0.1112 
-0.0176 -0.0843 
fairness 5 
0.0245*              
(0.145) 
-0.0151 0.1461*                
-0.0304 -0.0786 
fairness 6 
-0.0630***  
(0.0179) 
-0.0496 -0.09 
-0.0439 -0.0972 
fairness 7 
0.0488***   
(0.0170) 
0.0204 -0.1502 
-0.0408 -0.0951 
fairness 8 
-0.0163       
(0.0147) 
0.0498**   -0.0451 
-0.0209 -0.082 
fairness 10 
0.0181*          
(0.0102) 
-0.0438*    0.0872 
-0.0242 -0.0677 
Firm Age  
-0.0027*   -0.0002 0.0327***         
-0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0082 
Total Turnover (Firm size) 
-0.0612***  
(0.0222) 
0.2065***  0.0496                       
(0.1241) -0.0404 
Income Tax Liability 
0.0311***   -0.0172 -0.0336 
-0.012 -0.0149 -0.0837 
Constant  
1.2133***   4.1537***  5.3208***               
(0.5925) -0.1009 -0.241 
 
4.5 Discussion of findings 
The tax fairness measures that significantly influence tax compliance behaviour among corporate taxpayers in 
Kenya include measures 5, 6, 7 and 10. Out of these measures, it is only fairness measure number 6 which states 
that the tax office’s decisions are mainly based on facts and not opinions that negatively influence on tax 
compliance. This means that when firms perceive that the rules and approaches applied by the tax office treat them 
equally, there is a tendency for them to relax on submitting tax returns. This reflects perhaps existence of some 
moral hazard issue in that firms may think since all taxpayers are treated equally; even those that do not fully 
comply would still not be subjected to harsh penalties. It must be noted that the responses on compliance measure 
on returns were all spread between fully complying and partially complying and no response on zero-compliance.  
This result is also present when firms perceive that in a dispute the tax office would evaluate their information 
objectively and fairly and when tax office considers firm circumstances when taking decisions. This may imply 
when the tax office yields too much ground in seeking full compliance on returns and allow firms to make 
explanations on why they don’t fully submit returns, there is a tendency for firms to fail to fully submit returns. 
However, as firms perceive that the tax office’s decisions are mainly based on facts and not opinions, they seem 
to increase their compliance with the requirements to file returns. This is directly related to adherence to laid-down 
procedures and tax office tendency to allow explanations on failure to file returns. As such, firms would be 
obligated to make full submissions on time.  
When we account for the age of the firm, as age increases, firms tend to have more dedicated units that handle 
tax matters and as such would enhance their compliance. This explains the negative relationship between firm age 
and tax compliance as measured by extent of filing tax returns. The same explanation would also apply for the 
case of increasing firm size which relates negatively (implying increased size increases firm’s tendency to fully 
comply) with tax compliance. But as income tax liability increases firms would have a tendency to reduce their 
likelihood to fully file tax returns. This is consistent to expectations from theory since tax payment is a cost to the 
firm and all firms seek to minimize costs.  
In terms of the impact of tax fairness on tax compliance- as measured by the number of times tax payments 
were made, tax fairness measures 4,8 and 10 were found to be significant. Based on tax measure 4 which captures 
the notion that as firms increase their perceptions that tax office’s decisions are fair, they are likely to increase 
their compliance to tax payments. This is also the case when firms perceive that in circumstances when there is a 
dispute the resolution mechanisms in place are fair. However, when firms perceive that the tax office considers 
circumstances of each office in its decisions- there is a tendency for them to reduce tax compliance. This is perhaps 
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because firms can easily invest in reducing tax burden by exploring tax avoidance schemes when they know they 
tax office is flexible to consider their circumstances. 
As for the control variables, firm age and firm income tax liability re not significant determinants of 
compliance. However, firm total turnover is significant. As firm turnover increases, there is a tendency for the firm 
to fully comply with tax payments. This is because as the firm size (measured by turnover) increases its 
contribution to total tax revenue is significant and the revenue authority would be keen in the tax payments that 
the firm remits. As such, noncompliance is easily detected and where variations may occur, the tax office would 
be keen to scrutinize.   
We also sought to establish the influence of the procedural tax fairness measures on the likelihood of a firm 
understating its income when under financial stress. Among all the tax fairness measures, we found that only tax 
fairness measure number 5 (which captures perceptions of firms on whether the rules and approaches applied by 
tax office treat all taxpayers equally). We indicate that as firms perceive this statement to be true, there is a tendency 
for them to increase their likelihood of understating income. This is perhaps because of the likelihood that when 
all firms are treated equally, some can afford to understate their incomes without facing a real risk of penalties 
should they be discovered. In other words, when all firms are treated equally, moral hazard sets in and thus leading 
firms to attempt understating of income to minimize tax liability.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The tax authority could consider reviewing the tax system to ensure that the aspects of tax fairness that discourage 
compliance are addressed. For instance, the findings show that if the tax office rules and approaches applied in 
decision making treat taxpayers equally- they are likely to reduce tax compliance in terms of returns submitted as 
well as understatement of their income because of the potential moral hazard that such could cause. As such, there 
should be a differentiated approach to deal with firms so that moral hazard is minimized when firms know that if 
they fail to comply, they face the law. In addition, if there is extremely high level of objectivity and fairness in 
evaluation of individual firm circumstances, this may also encourage non- compliance especially on submission 
of returns and tax payments. A deviation from rules to adopt an objective understanding of individual firm 
circumstances can encourage non- compliance since firms can invest in providing explanations for non -
compliance. As such, an optimal balance between adherences to tax rules can work to encourage compliance since 
firms would not be tempted to understate income and /or fail to submit returns in anticipation of an occasion to 
explain their individual circumstances.  
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